Political shift triggers surge in political and religious misinformation in Bangladesh

Bangladesh experienced a sharp rise in political and religious misinformation in the wake of its political upheaval, as analyzed in Dismislab’s review of third-quarter fact-checking reports for 2024. This surge correlates with the political shift triggered by the government job quota reform movement, which ultimately led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the formation of an interim government under Dr. Muhammad Yunus.

From July to September 2024—the period marked by heightened political instability—eight fact-checking platforms documented 917 unique misinformation. Political misinformation dominated, comprising 42% of all unique fact-checks in the third quarter—nearly triple the share from the previous quarter and almost double that of the first. Religious misinformation also spiked, accounting for 12% of unique fact-checks in this period.

Political misinformation during this period targeted two main groups: Dr. Yunus and his interim government, and Sheikh Hasina along with Awami League leaders, often glorifying them and just as often demonizing them, further polarizing public perception. Both groups were frequently implicated through fabricated claims, often shared via fake graphic cards mimicking credible media posts. Meanwhile, religious misinformation largely targeted minority communities, using misleading photos and false narratives of communal violence, much of which originated from sources outside Bangladesh. 

Political Misinformation trends and targets

From July to September, Bangladeshi fact-checkers encountered a surge of misinformation, resulting in a record 1,345 fact-checks, of which 917 were unique cases. This represents a 32% increase compared to the unique cases recorded in the quarter preceding the national election (October to December 2023).

The chart shows a sharp uptick in misinformation beginning in June as protests escalated, followed by a temporary dip in mid-July due to internet shutdowns and political uncertainties, then a resurgence in August with the fall of Hasina’s government and the formation of a new interim administration, and ultimately reaching a peak in September. This overall rise is largely driven by political misinformation, which accounted for 42% of all unique fact-checks in the third quarter—up from 25% in the previous quarter. 

Political misinformation mainly targeted two sides of the political aisle: Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League, making up 36% of the total, and Dr. Yunus, his interim government, and leaders of the student movement, accounting for 35%. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), typically a common misinformation target in past years, dropped to just 8%, while misinformation targeting Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing increased to 11%, highlighting a shift in political focus.

Dr. Yunus and Sheikh Hasina in the spotlight

Two major individual targets of misinformation were Dr. Muhammad Yunus, chief adviser of the interim government, and Sheikh Hasina, the ousted former prime minister now exiled in India, each accounting for about 14% of the total. However, targeting is not monolithic; while some misinformation demonizes the target, other narratives also falsely glorify them.

To analyze this targeting pattern, Dismislab classified misinformation narratives into two categories: ‘negative’ and ‘positive or neutral.’ Given the subjective nature of this categorization, it was independently reviewed by three researchers to reach a conclusion. The data reveal a distinct difference in how each figure was portrayed in misinformation narratives: about half of the misinformation (49%) about Sheikh Hasina was glorifying or neutral, while approximately two-thirds (65%) of the narratives surrounding Dr. Yunus was negative or adversarial, highlighting how misinformation attempted to shape public perceptions of each leader.

Over a turbulent three-month period in Bangladesh, misinformation narratives around Sheikh Hasina evolved in response to shifting political events. In July, as Hasina confronted widespread protests with a heavy hand, misinformation largely focused on questioning her stability in office and implying internal dissent. Negative narratives suggested pressures from the military and international bodies, exemplified by claims such as “The new army chief asked Sheikh Hasina to step down,” “The United Nations has threatened to oust Sheikh Hasina’s government due to the quota movement.” and that she is “leaving the country amid the quota movement.” 

In August, negative stories intensified, with health rumors and fabricated departure plans circulating widely to cast doubt on her strength and legitimacy as a leader in exile. Examples like “Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s heart attack,” his son “claiming Sheikh Hasina is dead” and “Narendra Modi ordered Hasina to leave India” were emblematic of efforts to portray her as vulnerable and isolated. 

By September, with Hasina in exile and a new government taking shape, misinformation increasingly focused on her international image and amplifying claims of public rallies and demands for her return, painting her as a leader whose presence was crucial to Bangladesh’s stability. Social media posts surfaced claiming she was recognized globally, with fabricated claims such as “Sheikh Hasina was elected as the third honest head of government in the world,” “UN demands Sheikh Hasina as Prime Minister again” or  she “arrived in New York to address the United Nations” aiming to influence public sentiment toward her potential return.  Rumors have falsely suggested her imminent return (1, 2), as well as claims that she has given speeches and interviews (1, 2, 3) from India.

Absent in July, Dr. Yunus became a prominent figure in misinformation narratives starting in August, after Hasina’s ouster. Some narratives positioned Yunus as a symbol of reform and integrity, circulating populist claims such as his decision to “bring the bodies of expatriates to the country for free,” a supposed mandate that local government chairman candidates “must have a master’s degree,” and exaggerated reports of “magical changes” in Dhaka airport after he assumed power. Narratives falsely glorified Yunus as “the world’s only Nobel-winning head of government” and suggested he would remain in power for the next six years.

At the same time, negative claims surfaced, often linking him to financial and business controversies, such as alleged financial ties with Israel and the false claim that “Grameen Bank loan receivers won’t have to pay any installment,” which could create confusion and uncertainty among borrowers. Political misinformation also painted a divisive picture, suggesting that BNP leaders were calling for Yunus’s resignation and that he would block BNP from assuming power, fueling suspicions of his potential political motivations.

By September, the focus on Dr. Yunus intensified, with misinformation narratives becoming increasingly polarized. Yunus was depicted as both a populist leader with progressive initiatives and a figure aligned with conservative values. On one hand, misinformation glorified him with promises of populist reforms, claiming that he planned for the government to “provide free education to low-income students,” “guarantee government jobs for one member of each family,” and “offer allowances to students and the unemployed.”  

On the other hand, contrasting narratives portrayed him as aligned with conservative religious ideologies, with claims that he “preferred Surah Fatiha over the national anthem,” “loves scholars (alems) and wants to work closely with them,” had allegedly “placed a banner with the Kalima (Islamic creed) in his office,” believed “unemployed women should marry rather than work,” and promised “free electricity for mosques and madrasas.”

Social media posts about Yunus’s alleged resignation and international scrutiny heightened throughout the month, with claims such as “Yunus not returning to the country,” “he had stepped down,” “he was arrested in the US,” “his UN speech was canceled,” and “Russia objected to him speaking at the UN”—all portraying him as a leader under intense pressure.

Religious misinformation sparked

In the third quarter of this year, religion became the second most common topic for misinformation after politics, comprising 12% of all independent fact-check reports, with data showing a steady quarterly rise. Following the political shift in early August, a number of religious misinformation (1, 2, 3, 4) has focused on alleged attacks against minority communities, often using old or unrelated images and videos—particularly on X (formerly Twitter)—to portray incidents as recent communal violence. Fact-checks revealed that many fake accounts sharing this content operate from India. False statements have also circulated in the names of interim government advisers and leaders of the anti-discrimination student movement.

Following the fall of the government, attacks on Awami League properties and violence against minority communities were reported across various regions. However, old images and videos misrepresented as recent events circulated widely, including an August 7 video on X showing Hindu-owned shops allegedly on fire, which fact-checks determined was at least a month old; a restaurant fire in Satkhira depicted as a temple attack and a Chittagong clash involving Chhatra League activists shared as a Jamaat-e-Islami attack on Hindus.

In addition, misinformation about communal violence extended to fabricated quotes. For example, false claims attributed to a religious adviser suggested reduced Hajj and Umrah costs, and a fake quote from Sarjis Alam, a coordinator of the anti-discrimination student movement, claimed he advocated for an Islamic state with the Quran as the constitution. Posts on social media also falsely asserted that the Bangladesh Police logo had been altered to replace the boat symbol with the name of Allah. These narratives sought to exploit religious tensions and portray communal discord in the wake of the government transition.

Medium matters

In Bangladesh, videos remain the primary medium for spreading misinformation, accounting for 31% of independent fact-check reports in the third quarter of this year. However, this represents a decline from the previous two quarters, where videos comprised 44% and 42% of misinformation, respectively. Meanwhile, misinformation spread through graphic cards has been on the rise, with these cards making up 13% of fact-check reports in the second quarter, increasing to 19% in the third quarter.

Of the misinformation spread via graphic cards, 81% mimicked the names and logos of established media outlets. These graphic cards typically resemble those used by media organizations to share news on social media. Notably, nearly half of this misinformation (49%) was politically related, highlighting the ongoing use of deceptive visuals to influence public perception.

Methodology

This analysis delves into fact-check reports to discern patterns in false and misleading information within Bangladesh. It spans three months from July to September 2024, and incorporates reports published in eight fact checking websites including RumorScanner, BoomBD, NewsChecker, Fact Crescendo, Fact Watch, AFP Bangladesh, Ajker Patrika and Dismislab.

In instances where multiple sites countered the same misinformation, only one site’s fact-check report was considered as a unique sample to quantify subject-specific misinformation and disinformation. 

The unique fact-check reports were further divided into 15 categories, including politics, sports, health, nature and environment, entertainment, fraud, disaster, religion, science and technology, law and order, education, economy & development, defence, policy & public affairs, and others. 

Targets of disinformation, such as individuals and political figures, were documented separately.