From election to Iran war: How misinformation themes shifted in early 2026 in Bangladesh
The first quarter of 2026 saw a sharp increase in misinformation in Bangladesh, driven primarily by domestic political developments and, later in the quarter, by international conflict. During the period, fact-checkers verified 1,805 unique pieces of misinformation, a 40 percent increase compared to the previous quarter, when 1,292 cases were verified.
Political misinformation dominated the early part of the quarter. More than 80 percent of all unique misinformation identified in January and February involved politics, with a large share centered on the country’s 13th parliamentary election held on February 12. The election saw the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) come to power after winning 209 of the 300 parliamentary seats, keeping Bangladesh’s political arena–and misinformation ecosystem–heavily focused on electoral developments.
In March, however, the misinformation landscape shifted. Misinformation related to international affairs rose sharply following the Iran-United States war, accounting for 36 percent of all verified unique misinformation during the month. As a result, the share of political misinformation declined to 51 percent in March, an analysis by Dismislab shows.
Within political misinformation, various false claims targeting individuals dominated the narratives. Sixty-six percent of such misinformation primarily targeted politicians and senior officials through fabricated quotes, false crime allegations, or claims of arrest or attack. Nearly 80 percent of these cases involved figures from major political parties, with the BNP most frequently mentioned. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman appeared most often in these narratives.
This analysis is based on verification reports published by nine Bangladesh‑related fact‑checking organizations, including Dismislab. When multiple organizations factchecked the same claim, it was counted as a single unique instance of misinformation.
Election fueled political misinformation
Election‑related developments were the primary driver of political misinformation during the first two months of 2026. Nearly half of all unique political misinformation identified in January and February was directly linked to the parliamentary election. By March, however, election‑centered misinformation declined sharply, accounting for just 2 percent of political misinformation, as narratives shifted toward the newly formed government and its activities.
The election schedule was announced on December 11, 2025, marking the start of heightened political activity. After the nomination filing and candidate withdrawal process concluded, candidates began campaigning on January 22. The election was held on February 12, and a new cabinet was formed on February 17 following the BNP’s victory.
The nature of election‑related misinformation evolved over time. In the pre‑campaign phase, false claims focused on procedural uncertainties, including rumors that the election would be postponed, candidates had withdrawn, or nomination papers had been cancelled. Once campaigning began, misinformation increasingly took the form of fabricated campaign promises attributed to candidates, AI‑generated images exaggerating crowd sizes at rallies, and false survey results predicting election outcomes.
In the days immediately preceding the election and on election day, misinformation shifted again, centering on allegations of violence, vote rigging, and ballot box snatching. False claims that candidates boycotted the election or withdrew at the last moment also circulated widely during this period.
Following the election, misinformation narratives focused mainly on the results, with false claims creating confusion over vote counts and the performance of different candidates and parties. Claims of post‑election violence also circulated during this phase. (Read more about the patterns and nature of election-related misinformation in this report by Dismislab.
After the new cabinet was formed on February 17, misinformation increasingly targeted the composition of the government and its proposed actions. False claims spread about who had been appointed or removed from ministerial positions, as well as about policy initiatives the newly-formed BNP government was allegedly planning to implement.
Dominance of person‑centered misinformation
Political misinformation during the first quarter of 2026 was driven primarily by claims targeting individuals, particularly politicians and those holding ministerial positions. An analysis of fact‑check reports shows that 66 percent of all political misinformation during the period centered on individuals.
The most common forms of such misinformation included fabricated quotes or statements attributed to public figures, allegations linking individuals to corruption or criminal activity, and false claims that individuals had been arrested, granted bail, or attacked. The specific focus of these claims also shifted over time. Ahead of the election, misinformation largely centered on candidates receiving or withdrawing nominations. After the vote, the narrative moved toward false claims about who had secured positions in the new cabinet.
Nearly 80 percent of person-centric political misinformation involved leaders or activists from four major political parties–the BNP, Jamaat‑e‑Islami, National Citizen Party (NCP), and the Awami League–as well as advisors of the interim government. The BNP featured most prominently, with 34 percent of such misinformation mentioning its leaders or activists. Overall, more than half of all person‑centered misinformation cases consisted of fabricated quotes or false statements attributed to individuals.
Among individual figures, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman appeared most frequently in misinformation narratives. He was followed by Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman; Awami League President and ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina; former interim government Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus; and BNP Secretary General and Local Government, Rural Development and Co‑operatives Minister Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir.
In contrast, misinformation involving political parties, law‑enforcement agencies, and public or private institutions accounted for 30 percent of political misinformation cases. Within this category, three political parties – the ruling BNP, the main opposition Jamaat, and the ousted Awami League – featured most frequently. Together, they were mentioned in 88 percent of all organization‑centered misinformation cases, with Jamaat appearing most frequently, accounting for 42 percent.
Taken together, both person and organization‑centered misinformation shows that half of all political misinformation during the quarter mentioned either the BNP (31 percent) or the Jamaat (21 percent). The Awami League was mentioned in 12 percent of cases.
Misinformation types and targets
The type of misinformation circulating during the first quarter of 2026 varied significantly across political actors. Leaders of the BNP and NCP and members of the interim government were often targeted with fabricated quotes and false statements. On the other hand, misinformation about Jamaat more frequently focused on alleged criminal activity, while false claims involving the Awami League centered on rallies and political gatherings.
Most misinformation involving the BNP during the quarter focused on Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, reflecting his central role following the party’s return to power. Before the election, false campaign promises were widely circulated in his name. After the election, misinformation shifted to fabricated statements about the policies and actions the newly formed government was supposedly planning to implement. These included false claims that the government would shut down the metro rail system, introduce digital local buses, allow the ousted Awami League to resume political activities, or bring Sheikh Hasina back from India with state honors.
Fabricated quotes were also attributed to other BNP leaders who joined the new cabinet. For instance, false claims alleged that the education minister announced a ban on OpenAI’s ChatGPT or that the finance and planning minister proposed a fourfold increase in taxes.
After fabricated quotes, the second most common form of misinformation targeting the BNP consisted of allegations of criminal behavior. False claims alleged that BNP leaders or activists attacked opposition supporters or civilians after the election (1, 2, 3), engaged in extortion or sexual violence, or were arrested with weapons. Overall, 77 percent of misinformation involving the BNP aimed at discrediting the party, while 23 percent portrayed it favorably.
Among misinformation narratives involving the Jamaat, allegations of criminal activity accounted for 32 percent of cases. Many of these claims falsely alleged that Jamaat leaders or members of affiliated organizations were arrested with weapons (1, 2, 3) in various locations, or that activists carried out attacks in areas where voters did not support the party during the election.
Fabricated quotes were also attributed to Jamaat leaders, including party chief Shafiqur Rahman. Some false claims alleged that he proposed making marriage at age 16 mandatory if Jamaat came to power or accused senior figures, including a former chief advisor, of betrayal. Overall, 78 percent of misinformation involving Jamaat appeared aimed at criticism or opposition.
A sharply different pattern emerged in misinformation involving the Awami League. Analysis shows that 97 percent of misinformation involving the party during the quarter was favorable to it. The largest share, 32 percent, centered on rallies and political gatherings. Old footage of demonstrations, along with AI‑generated images and videos, was repeatedly shared with false claims that they showed recent Awami League rallies (1, 2, 3). Other false narratives claimed that party leaders and activists were being persecuted or released on bail, or that ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reappeared publicly or delivered speeches.
War and misinformation
Beyond domestic politics, international affairs emerged as a major driver of misinformation during the first quarter of 2026. The most significant surge followed the joint U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28. In March, misinformation related to international affairs accounted for 36 percent of all verified unique cases, marking the highest share for any non‑domestic topic during the quarter.
Misinformation circulating in Bangladesh around the Iran–United States conflict was overwhelmingly favorable to Iran. As a Muslim‑majority country, Bangladesh often sees expressions of public sympathy toward Muslim‑majority states such as Iran or Palestine during conflicts involving Israel or the United States, influenced in part by religious sentiment. This dynamic was reflected in the nature and framing of misinformation narratives during the conflict.
To portray Iran as holding a strong position in the conflict, false content frequently relied on recycled or unrelated visuals. Old photographs and videos, footage from video games, and AI‑generated images and videos were widely shared with misleading claims. For example, footage of a casino fire in Mexico and an earlier ship accident in Italy was falsely presented as evidence of an Iranian strike destroying an Israeli air base or wrecking a U.S. oil tanker. Video game clips were similarly circulated with claims that they showed Iranian missile attacks on Israel.
In total, more than 50 AI‑generated images and videos were identified in misinformation narratives linked to the Iran–United States conflict during the quarter.
Misinformation through graphic cards rise
Traditionally, video has been the most common format for spreading misinformation in Bangladesh. In the final quarter of 2025, 51 percent of all verified unique misinformation cases were disseminated through video. In the first quarter of 2026, that share declined significantly to 36 percent.
Graphic cards emerged as the dominant format during the quarter. Overall, 43 percent of all verified unique misinformation cases were spread through graphic cards, up from 28 percent in the previous quarter. Nearly all misinformation disseminated through this format involved politics, reflecting the heightened political activity during the period.
The use of misleading graphic cards designed to resemble news posts from mainstream Bangladeshi media outlets also increased. These fake photocards often carried the names and logos of established news organizations, lending false claims an appearance of credibility. In the previous quarter, misinformation spread through such branded photo or graphic cards accounted for 18 percent of cases. In the first quarter of 2026, that figure rose to 23 percent.
Methodology
This analysis is based on reports published between January and March 2026 on nine fact-checking websites: Rumor Scanner, BoomBD, Newschecker, Fact Crescendo, Fact Watch, AFP Bangladesh, Ajker Patrika, Dismislab and The Dissent. When multiple websites published fact-check reports on the same piece of misinformation, only one report was counted as unique.
The reports were categorized into 17 topics: politics, sports, health, disaster, religion, nature and environment, entertainment, fraud, science and technology, law and order, education, economy and development, defense, public policy, international affairs, migration, and others.
Political misinformation was classified into two primary categories: person-centered and organization-centered. Claims primarily targeting or referring to an individual were classified as person-centered, while claims focused on the activities, actions or role of an organization were classified as organization-centered. Political misinformation was also classified by directional intent to assess whether a claim appeared to support a political party or to oppose and discredit it.
Political misinformation was also classified into narrative categories, defined as follows:
Fake Quotes: This category includes false statements or comments attributed to any individual. It covers both entirely false remarks spread in someone’s name and genuine past statements that were reshared with misleading or recent claims.
Election: This category includes misinformation related to the 13th parliamentary election. It covers false claims about government decisions on the electoral process, election results, election-related violence, and fake polls or surveys.
Rallies/Assemblies: This includes misinformation where visuals of rallies or assemblies of one political party were used and falsely claimed as belonging to another, or old and unrelated footage of gatherings circulated with recent claims.
Allegations of corruption, crime: This category includes false claims that political parties or their leaders and activists were involved in corruption or criminal activities.
Allegations of attacks, death: It includes misinformation claiming that individuals were persecuted or killed for being followers of a particular political party, as well as false news of deaths of political leaders.
Court, prison, and arrest: Misinformation involving false claims of arrests or releases from prison, or misleading allegations of detention related to political figures were considered under this category.
Clash/Violence: This category covers misinformation involving old or unrelated footage of attacks or violence circulated as recent incidents, as well as false claims where scenes of violence involving one party were attributed to another.
Foreign Connection: This category includes misinformation claiming that foreign individuals or entities commented on, influenced or interfered in Bangladesh’s internal political affairs, or that Bangladeshi individuals had connections with foreign entities.
Character assassination: This category includes misinformation aimed at discrediting or defaming the personal character of political leaders or activists.
Party Switching: This category includes misinformation about individuals changing political affiliation, joining or leaving parties.
Party Decisions: This category includes false claims about party or institutional decisions involving appointments, removals, nominations, suspensions or other internal actions.
Cabinet Changes: This category includes misinformation about appointments to the Cabinet, removals from ministerial positions, portfolio changes, resignations or other claims related to the composition of the government Cabinet.
Others: This category includes misinformation that does not fall under any of the above classifications.
