How fake news photocards are hijacking media credibility to spread political misinformation
In recent months, fake photocards imitating established news outlets have become one of the main spreaders of political misinformation in Bangladesh. Circulated widely on social media, these graphic cards replicate the logos, fonts, color schemes, and layouts of familiar media organizations, allowing fabricated claims to appear credible. Media analysts say the deception is intentional: the visual authority of trusted journalism is being weaponized to influence public opinion.
The spread of these photocards began rising from September 2025, before accelerating sharply in the lead‑up to Bangladesh’s 13th National Parliamentary Election. Between December 2025 and February 2026, they emerged as a dominant vehicle for political misinformation. Dismislab’s analysis shows that nearly half of all political misinformation circulated between December 11 last year and February 20 this year originated from media‑mimicking photocards, repeatedly deployed to distort narratives around high‑profile political events and trigger confusion during periods of heightened tension.
This pattern is reflected in an analysis of 538 political fact‑check reports published by nine Bangladesh‑focused fact‑checking organizations over the six‑month period from September 2025 to February 2026. Across these reports, fact‑checkers verified 690 distinct fake photocards, many designed to closely resemble established outlets such as Amar Desh, Kaler Kantho, and Jamuna Television. The findings show that political actors used these photocards both to discredit opponents and to amplify exaggerated or false claims of popularity.
Individual political figures were frequent targets. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and Bangladesh Jamaat‑e‑Islami Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman appeared most often in false photocards, while former interim government Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus was also targeted. In several cases, the misinformation took a sexualized form, particularly against women in politics and public service. Elsewhere, fake photocards were used to provoke communal fear and hostility, underscoring the wider social risks of the tactic.
In Bangladesh, media outlets often share news on social media through graphic cards. However, media experts warn that the rise of these fake photocards presents a credibility crisis for mainstream journalism. When readers trust information simply because it carries a familiar news logo – and later discover it to be false – the damage falls on the outlet being imitated. According to experts, the objective of these photocards is not persuasion through argument, but engagement through borrowed trust: exploiting the credibility of established media to ensure that false content spreads quickly and widely.
The rise of fake photocards
Analysis of fake political photocards shows that they follow two dominant message formats, both designed to mirror the authority of mainstream news. More than half (51.7 percent) of them appeared as news‑style reports, falsely claiming incidents such as crimes involving party leaders or activists, arrests, raids, or fabricated survey results suggesting electoral momentum for one side. The remaining 48.3 percent were fabricated statements, falsely attributed to political leaders, activists, or government officials on critical political issues.
The spread of these photocards was closely tied to political events and surged in response to moments of heightened public attention. Although their use began increasing from September 2025, it rose sharply from December onward, peaking in January, when election campaigning intensified. Day‑by‑day analysis reveals a consistent pattern: whenever a major political incident occurred, the volume of misleading photocards increased almost immediately.
One such spike followed the shooting of Inquilab Mancha spokesperson Sharif Osman Bin Hadi on December 12, who died on December 18. In the aftermath, misinformation related to the incident circulated widely across social media. Fake photocards imitating established news outlets falsely claimed that a large portion of the alleged Tk 127 crore linked to the case had been laundered into the account of a relative of political commentator Pinaki Bhattacharya. Another fabricated photocard, styled as an Amar Desh news report and featuring Jamaat Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, falsely quoted him as saying that no election would take place without the Awami League.
A similar misinformation surge occurred on December 25, when Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Chairman and current Prime Minister Tarique Rahman returned to Bangladesh from London after 17 years. His homecoming prompted a wave of fake photocards. Some falsely claimed that patients were dying in ambulances due to traffic congestion caused by reception programs. Others fabricated statements attributed to Tarique, alleging that he had expressed regret over incidents involving unruly activists during the celebrations.
The circulation of fake photocards intensified again during the formal election‑campaign period. After Islami Andolan Bangladesh announced its withdrawal from the proposed 11‑party electoral alliance on January 16 over seat‑sharing disputes, multiple fabricated claims appeared in media‑style photocards. Some falsely cited unnamed analysts warning that Jamaat could lose 175 seats because of the withdrawal, while others claimed that India had objected to Islami Andolan’s inclusion in the alliance.
The highest single‑day volume of political misinformation through fake photocards was recorded on the day before the election, February 11. That day, photocards falsely reported that candidates in various constituencies had withdrawn from the race. Others alleged that party leaders and activists were being detained while distributing money to buy votes, or that weapons had been recovered from candidates’ homes. Senior figures were also targeted. One fake photocard falsely attributed a statement to National Citizen Party (NCP) leader and current Member of Parliament Hasnat Abdullah, claiming he had announced the BNP’s “funeral” would take place on February 12. Another attributed a fabricated quote to the Jamaat chief, stating that the party was willing to come to power even through vote rigging.
Across all cases, the intent was consistent. Most fake photocards were used to attack political parties or their leaders, either politically or personally. Analysis shows that nearly 62 percent were geared toward political attacks, while roughly 16 percent targeted individuals through personal allegations. A smaller share (12.5 percent) was used for positive promotion, exaggerating the popularity or electoral strength of a political party or leader.
Fake photocards as misinformation tool
Among the fake photocards analyzed, those imitating the daily Amar Desh were used most frequently to spread political misinformation. A total of 148 fake photocards replicated the outlet’s visual identity, making it the most commonly copied media house. Other outlets whose designs were repeatedly imitated include Kaler Kantho, Jamuna Television, Rtv, and Kalbela, all of which were widely used to lend false claims an appearance of credibility.
An examination of how different political groups used these designs reveals distinct patterns. BNP‑supporting pages and profiles often circulated photocards mimicking Amar Desh, Jamuna Television, Nagorik TV, and BBC Bangla. Awami League supporters, by contrast, primarily used designs resembling Kaler Kantho, Rtv, DBC News, Prothom Alo, and Janakantha. Meanwhile, Jamaat supporters most frequently shared fake photocards styled after Ekattor TV, Jugantor, Samakal, Channel 24, and BanglaVision.
Target: Parties
An analysis of misinformation trends shows that Bangladesh Jamaat‑e‑Islami was the most frequent target. Of the 281 identified instances of misinformation involving the party, 246 portrayed Jamaat or its leaders negatively, while 34 framed them positively. Negative photocards commonly accused party figures of criminal activity, including allegations that a Jamaat leader had illegally occupied government land or that a female Jamaat leader was caught by locals and handed over to police on theft accusations while campaigning under the party’s electoral symbol, the Daripalla (weighing scale).
Most of the positive misinformation involving Jamaat focused on exaggerated claims of popularity. Fake photocards circulated asserting that opinion polls showed the party winning more than 180 parliamentary seats, while others claimed Jamaat candidates were leading in multiple constituencies based on fabricated exit‑poll results on election day.
BNP was also heavily targeted. Of 212 instances of misinformation linked to the party, 197 were negative, 13 positive, and two neutral. Negative claims included fabricated statements attributed to former interim government adviser Asif Nazrul, alleging that the BNP was disrupting national stability and should “learn politics” from Jamaat. Other photocards falsely claimed that the BNP had announced a shutdown of “Bikash Paribahan” after the transport company refused to pay a bribe.
Positive misinformation related to the BNP largely centred on defections and momentum, with fake claims asserting that hundreds of Jamaat members in Gaibandha district or dozens of activists of Islami Chhatra Shibir, Jamaat’s student wing, in Cumilla district joined rival BNP’s student wing Chatradal.
Nearly all misinformation involving the newly formed NCP and its leaders was negative. Fake photocards styled as news reports alleged that an NCP activist had died while attempting to steal a transformer, or claimed that a female NCP leader was addicted to Yaba (an addictive pill), falsely citing police sources.
Two parties stood out as exceptions. Misinformation involving the Bangladesh Awami League and Islami Andolan Bangladesh was more frequently positive than negative. Of 31 instances involving the Awami League, 26 portrayed the party positively, often claiming that their ousted leader Sheikh Hasina would return to the country from India on a specific date, or that party leaders were staging mass protests demanding her return. Other claims falsely suggested that former Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus wanted to hand over power to her, or that US President Donald Trump had asked for Hasina’s reinstatement in office.
Similarly, of 26 instances of misinformation related to Islami Andolan Bangladesh, 18 were positive. Fake photocards promoted claims that the party’s electoral symbol (hand fan) was leading all others in opinion polls, or that a significant number of Jamaat leaders and activists had defected to the party.
Target: Leaders
Among individual political figures, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman emerged as the most frequent target of misinformation. A total of 78 false claims circulated about him through fake photocards. Many of these narratives alleged that he was returning to Bangladesh after striking “secret deals” with India or with unnamed foreign actors and the so‑called “deep state.” Other fabricated claims portrayed him as corrupt and the mastermind of the August 21 grenade attack on an Awami League rally in Dhaka, or described him as a fugitive.
The second‑most targeted figure was Jamaat Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, who was subjected to at least 61 instances of misinformation. Several fake photocards claimed that Victory Day would be abolished if Jamaat came to power or that religious shrines across the country would be demolished. Other narratives sought to delegitimize the party by alleging the use of armed cadres during the election, threats of rog‑kata (slitting tendons) programs, or the issuing of derogatory remarks about women.
The third‑most targeted figure was Dr. Muhammad Yunus, with 21 false claims circulating about him. Fake photocards promoted narratives of internal conflict, alleging rifts between Yunus and NCP leader Nahid Islam and portraying him as untrustworthy or self‑serving. Additional fabricated claims suggested that Yunus had threatened to resign unless the military provided security, had been arrested, declared a state of emergency, or had “fled through the back door” abandoning his associates.
Beyond national‑level figures, misinformation also targeted student leaders and party officials. Twenty fake photocards targeted Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU) Vice President Shadik Kayem, while 19 instances were directed at BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, indicating that misinformation campaigns extended across different tiers of political influence.
Sexualized & communal narratives
In addition to political attacks, fake photocards were repeatedly used to amplify sexualized and threatening narratives, particularly against women in politics and public life. Dismislab identified at least 34 instances in which sexually suggestive or explicitly degrading falsehoods targeted political leaders and activists. Female figures, including Dr. Tasnim Jara, Sabikunnahar Tamanna, Fatema Tasnim Juma, and Dr. Mahmuda Alam Mitu, were subjected to derogatory language and fabricated claims about their personal lives.
The allegations circulated through these photocards ranged from unfounded assertions about pregnancy before marriage and detentions in hotels to false claims about sexually transmitted diseases. In some cases, the misinformation escalated into direct threats, including statements invoking “gang rape” or threats of entering their homes to kill them – language that significantly heightens the risk of real‑world harm.
Sexualized misinformation was not limited to women. Fake photocards also targeted male political figures, circulating fabricated allegations of extramarital affairs, secret recordings, or unethical relationships. Such claims were directed at figures including Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis Ameer Maulana Mamunul Haque, NCP leader Nahid Islam, and DUCSU Vice President Shadik Kayem, again using the visual authority of news‑styled designs to lend credibility to false narratives.
The analysis further identified five instances in which fake photocards were used to incite communal tension or threaten minority communities. Some photocards falsely claimed that a Chatradal leader had threatened to go door to door in Hindu households, warning that those who did not vote for Dhaner Shish (Sheaf of Paddy) would be killed inside their homes. Others alleged that BNP leaders had threatened minority families with forced displacement to India. In a similar vein, photocards attributed fabricated statements to Jamaat, falsely claiming that the party’s Ameer had said Hindus would be sent to India if they did not vote for the Daripalla.
The cost to media credibility
Fake photocards designed to resemble established news outlets have consequences that extend beyond misinformation itself. By copying trusted media identities, these cards not only mislead readers but also undermine the credibility of the institutions they imitate.
Alfaz Anam, Associate Editor of the daily Amar Desh, said the practice erodes public trust in mainstream journalism. “Social media users often do not feel the need to verify information while scrolling quickly,” he said. “Often, they trust the information simply by seeing a familiar logo or color scheme. But when they later realize it is false, it leaves a negative impression of the newspaper, making people believe we publish fake news.”
In many cases, social media users have been seen believing and sharing such fake photocards without verification, unintentionally amplifying their reach. According to media professionals, this accelerates a wider crisis of trust, blurring the distinction between legitimate journalism and manufactured falsehoods.
News organisations have begun taking defensive measures. Shawkat Hossain, Head of Online at Prothom Alo, said the outlet routinely issues clarification posts when fake photocards circulate under its name. “Whenever we come across such photocards, we publish our own notice stating that this content is not ours and asking readers to rely on our official platforms,” he said.
Experts say the imitation of established media outlets is deliberate and strategic. Those behind fake photocards understand that standalone claims rarely gain traction. When false information appears under the branding of a recognized news organisation, it inherits borrowed credibility, making audiences more likely to accept and share it.
Dr. Sumon Rahman, Dean of the School of Social Science at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB) and Head of the Media Studies and Journalism Department, said two factors primarily drive the spread of these photocards: ease and legitimacy. “They are easy to produce,” he said, “and they appear to carry the endorsement of news media. When information comes under a news outlet’s name, people perceive it as more credible and share it more readily. The motivation is simple – to make misinformation go viral at the lowest possible cost.”
He stressed that improving media literacy is critical to addressing the problem. However, he cautioned that such progress is neither quick nor straightforward. “Building the ability to critically evaluate media takes time and sustained effort,” he said.
Methodology
Between September 2025 to February 2026, nine Bangladesh-focused fact-checking organizations debunked 538 unique political misinformation, all involving fake media photocards. Some reports covered multiple photocards. When counted separately, these 538 reports verified a total of 690 distinct fake photocards imitating different mainstream media outlets. These 690 photocards were analyzed in this report.
To examine the political affiliations of those involved in spreading misinformation through fake media photocards, the pages and profiles from which these were circulated were analyzed. In this process, recent posts and their narratives, as well as profile and cover images, were taken into consideration. In many cases, users’ political leanings were identified based on the type of content they shared in certain Facebook groups. However, it was not possible to determine the political affiliations of all pages and profiles mentioned in the fact-check reports; data were collected only from those that remain active on social media.
